from an Empirical Standpoint (1874 Standpoint ( /2008 and, more particularly, in his lectures on Descriptive Psychology (1890-1/1982) . Hence it may be referred to as Brentanian. This doesn't mean that I take Brentano's own position to be definitive and beyond improvement, nor that all the claims I shall support are Brentano's. But I think the proposed view is quite consistent with the spirit of his own psychological research program, which aims at giving the best possible description of mental occurrences as they are first-personally experienced.
The plan of this paper is as follows. To begin, I will discuss some reasons for being a (neo-)Brentanian about the mind ( §1) and will briefly introduce the main characteristics of Brentano's internalist description program ( §2). Then, I will turn to the current 'inseparatist' way of dealing with intentionality and phenomenality, focusing on the demand for unity coming from advocates of phenomenal intentionality ( §3). I will suggest that the unity of the mind may be put in a new light if we put aside metaphysical-epistemological questions, go back to Brentano's description program, and endorse his thesis that the mental is something unified in which various parts must be distinguished ( §4). In the last section, I will draw some lessons from this approach with respect to the connection between intentionality and phenomenality ( §5). More pointedly, I will hold that, for any representational content R, R is (in Brentano's terms) an abstractive or 'distinctional' part of the relevant state, and that, for any qualitative aspect Q, Q is an abstractive or 'distinctional' part of the relevant representational content R.
Why Go Back to Brentano?
What, if anything, can we expect to gain by adopting a Brentanian approach to the mind? Within contemporary philosophy of mind, two distinct motivations are usually put forward to justify something like a return to Brentano: his intentionality thesis and his theory of inner perception.
Brentano is best known for having introduced intentionality as a preferential criterion for the mental. Contrasting with a physical state, a mental state is intentional in the sense that it is directed at something or that it represents something as being a certain way. Accordingly, intentionality might be taken as the 'mark' of the mental. The classical way to unpack this idea is to say that everything mental is intentional (this is the so-called Brentano Thesis) and everything intentional is mental (the Converse Brentano Thesis). These theses are commonly regarded as the core of Brentano's legacy. However, whereas the intentionality criterion for the mental may be traced back to Brentano, 3 it may be doubted that contemporary philosophers of mind have understood this view in exactly the way Brentano did, and this for two reasons.
First, the Brentano Thesis, arguably, has been widely misunderstood. At least for
Chisholm 1957) , the intentionality criterion was interpreted in an ontological or metaphysical way. Chisholm's line of thought is well known. It goes somewhat like this: If 'intentional idiom' proves to be irreducible or ineliminable, then mind is irreducible to matter, and metaphysical dualism is true. As suggested by Moran (1996) , Brentano, unlike Chisholm, probably never made such an antireductionist use of the intentionality criterion, which he rather takes as a classificatory and descriptive factor. I will go back to this descriptive dimension below ( §2).
Second, it is known that Brentano does not have explicitly developed a coherent theory of intentionality. In his 1874/2008, he simply uses the notion of 'intentional in-existence', which is deeply controversial. For this reason, it has sometimes been held that Brentano bequeathed to his heirs not so much a philosophical theory as a problem, namely, the problem of objectless presentations, which he himself left 'unresolved' (Dummett 1993: 48) . Against such an interpretation, some Brentanian scholars during the last fifteen years have attempted to provide us with a historical reconstruction of Brentano's theory of intentionality (see, e.g., Chrudzimski 2001 , Albertazzi 2006 . Without discussing such tentative reconstructions, I
shall restrict myself to saying that, at least at first sight, the conception of intentional content developed by Edmund Husserl (1857-1938) offers a much more promising framework in order to construe a phenomenological theory of intentionality. This claim is supported by the fact that the semantic dimension of Husserlian contents-the so-called 'noematical sense' (Husserl 1913 (Husserl /1982 : §89)-makes it easier to accommodate a series of descriptive and experiential features that are often associated with intentionality, such as existential opacity (i.e., the ability to be directed at A even if A does not exist), referential opacity (the ability to be directed at A without being directed at B, even if A is B), and the publicity of intentional objects (the ability for several people to be directed at one and the same object). In this respect, it might be urged that we should return to Husserl rather than to Brentano.
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More recently, however, another motivation for developing a Brentanian or neoBrentanian account of the mind has been found in Brentano's theory of inner perception. This theory is designed to cover another basic dimension of the mental, namely, the fact that our mental life, or at least a good deal of it, is conscious rather than unconscious (viz. is conscious in the intransitive sense). According to Brentano, this holds for every mental phenomenon or mental occurrence. He therefore supports the view that every mental phenomenon is accompanied by an 'inner perception' in virtue of which it may be said to be conscious in the intransitive sense. For instance, when I am hearing a sound, I do not only perceive the sound, but simultaneously perceive that I am hearing a sound. The 'external' perception of the sound is accompanied by the 'internal' perception of the act of hearing the sound (Brentano 1874 (Brentano /2008 (Brentano : 179/146 [1995 with this kind of approach is that it is exposed to infinite regress, since the condition for m 2 to be conscious is that it is in turn referred to by a third-level state m 3 , and so on. Brentano's theory escapes this objection, for inner perception is not conceived as a higher-level act that would be distinct from the first-level act, e.g. from the act of hearing. Rather, Brentano maintains that there is 'a single mental phenomenon', the act of hearing, with two objects:
The <sound> as 'primary object' and the <hearing of the sound> as 'secondary object' (ibid.).
The act is self-representing or self-perceiving in a way that allows us to avoid infinite regress (see also Brentano 1911 Brentano : 138-9 [1995 ). To sum up, the theory of inner perception seems to pave the way for a more promising self-representational approach of consciousness (see
Kriegel 2003 and forthcoming).
This second motivation, however, brings new issues to light. One objection that can be raised against the Brentanian version of self-representationalism is that it conceives of consciousness on the model of object-reference, as if we were directed at the hearing of the sound in roughly the same way as we are directed at the sound. Yet this is a hardly plausible view. Suppose I am actually hearing a sound. Unless I have already accomplished an act of psychological reflection, the hearing of the sound is not an object for me in any sense of the term. Husserl (e.g., 1900 Husserl (e.g., -1/1993 Husserl (e.g., : 385 [1970 ) had already raised the same objection against Brentano. The core-idea of his criticism may be rendered as follows: In pre-reflexive consciousness the hearing of the sound is certainly experienced, but not perceived or contemplated. Only reflection turns it into an object. Following this line of argumentation, there is no reason to admit one single act with two objects. Experience rather suggests that we are at one time directed at one single object, namely, the intentional object (the sound itself). 
Brentano's Internalist Description Program
It is certainly not incorrect to say that the main ambition of contemporary philosophy of mind of the last half century has been to explain the mind in a way that is consistent with the explicitly specify what is it we want to explain, otherwise explanation could miss its target;
(2) the describing of first-personally experienced mental states is the best-not to say the only-way to meet this requirement.
Supporters of the naturalistic explanation program may resist the demand of preliminary description either by rejecting (1) or by rejecting (2). There is no need to enter this debate here. Suffice it to insist that Brentano's program is quite compatible with an explanatory approach to the mind, since it aims at nothing but providing explanatory theories with a usable descriptive basis.
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Be that as it may, one important issue for supporters of the internalist description program comes from the fact that introspection, when uncontrolled, may be inaccurate.
Brentano's own position, on this point, is more nuanced than is often believed. In particular, he never held that introspective accessibility to our own mental states is a guarantee for us to (1894-95/2011: 5-7, 1908: 52-53, 1916: 98) , Cornelius (1897: 4-10), Höfler (1897 : 4-7, 1890 : 2, 1906 : 184-185, 1930 : 50-72), Husserl (1901 /1993 , Stumpf (1906 : 35, 1907 : 55, 1917 : 4), Pfänder (1900 : 7, 1920 , Reinach (1914 Reinach ( /1989 , among others. See also the most quoted passage from Brentano (1895: 34): "My school distinguishes between Psychognosie and genetic psychology (on the basis of a remote analogy with geognosy and geology). The task of the former is to exhibit all of the basic mental elements. All other mental phenomena are derived from the combination of these ultimate psychological elements, just as words are built up out of letters." 9 In my view, internalism is a methodological, not a metaphysical option. It does not imply any form of idealism, antirealism, or solipsism. 10 As recently suggested (Gallagher/Zahavi 2008: 6), it is probably all the more appropriate to pursue this program today as most of the lively debates in the philosophy of mind press us to endorse metaphysical or epistemological options without providing us with a clear description of the phenomena under study.
have a clear apprehension of them, nor that this apprehension cannot be improved. More exactly, Brentano maintains that every mental occurrence, as a matter of fact, is something more or less complicated. This is why the required description aims at identifying the parts or elements of the mind and the way they are connected (Brentano 1890 (Brentano -1/1982 (Brentano : 1, 10 [2002 ). To put it shortly, it aims at analyzing the mind. 12 Mental analysis is precisely supposed to compensate for the lack of distinctness that attaches to the apprehension of mental occurrences. Hence describing a mental state is nothing but analyzing it, i.e., making distinctions that let appear its constitutive parts without destroying its actual unity.
This brings me to my next point.
Inseparatism and the Demand for Unity
So far I have briefly sketched Brentano's internalist description program from consideration for the current research situation. In this section, I shall suggest that what is at stake in recent theories of phenomenal intentionality is not so much the rise of a new explanatory paradigm as the rise of a new descriptive framework. Otherwise put: The question at issue is not first and foremost that of the reducibility (or irreducibility) of mental occurrences to physical states, but that of the nature and the structure of the mental as it is first-personally experienced.
At least since the late seventies, it is commonly held that paradigmatic mental states have two basic features: They are phenomenally conscious or have a phenomenal character, in the sense that there is 'something it is like' for the subject to undergo them (Farrell 1950 , Nagel 1974 , and they are intentional or have a representational content, in the sense that they represent something as being in a certain way (Harman 1990 : 34, Crane 1992 This claim, however, has been recently challenged to the effect that phenomenal character and representational content are not separable but intimately connected features. This alternative line of thought is at the origin of a family of views-including versions of representationalism and theories of phenomenal intentionality-which may be referred to under the broader head of 'inseparatism' (Graham et al. 2007: 468-69 and 2009: 522) .
On the inseparatist outlook, the separability claim must be rejected. This can be done in two ways: Either by arguing that phenomenal character is not a nonrepresentational extra ingredient besides intentionality, or by arguing that intentionality is not genuinely 13 I follow Crane (2001: 74-76) and distinguish the qualitative character that attaches to sensory experiential states from the more controversial notion of qualia, which refers to non-intentional properties of the experience. The basic idea behind this is that the qualitative character of sensory experiences is an explanandum (it is something that any satisfactory theory needs to account for), while the notion of qualia is a much-disputed explanans (it is advocated by some philosophers in order to account for the qualitative character of sensory experiences).
disconnected from phenomenality. The first road has been travelled by representationalists or intentionalists such as Dretske (1995) , Tye (1995) , and others, while the second road has been travelled by supporters of phenomenal intentionality such as Loar (2003), Kriegel (2003 , 2011 , forthcoming), or Graham et al. (2007 Last but not least, (c) another case that can be made for inseparatism is its theoretical attractiveness. Inseparatism is theoretically attractive, for it implies that we do not need two distinct theories to give a satisfactory account of the mind: A non-phenomenal theory of intentionality plus a putative non-intentional 'theory' of phenomenality. If phenomenal character and representational content go hand in hand, then one single theory-a theory of phenomenal intentionality-will do the job, providing us with a unified picture of the mind.
Since theoretical attractiveness has nothing to do with the description of mental occurrences, we can safely restrict ourselves to the first two cases. Let us call them the argument from introspection and the argument from co-variance. Further, let us assume that these arguments are compelling and that inseparatism is true. If we want to construct a satisfactory theory of phenomenal intentionality, we have to think of the connection between intentionality and phenomenality in a way that accommodates both introspective unity and exhibits purely in virtue of its phenomenal character" (Kriegel 2013). What is striking in the supervenience theory is that it implies a certain priority of R over P or, conversely, of P over
R. Such interpretations therefore suggest that what is at stake in phenomenal intentionality is
not only the descriptive claim according to which "the mental is a unified rather than a bifurcated phenomenon" (Graham et al. 2007: 470) . The supervenience theory rather refers to an explanatory dimension. Supporters of phenomenal intentionality, for example, seem inclined to endorse at least one of the following theses: (i) Phenomenal intentionality is explanatorily prior to non-phenomenal intentionality; (ii) phenomenality is explanatorily prior to intentionality.
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Whatever version of the supervenience theory we may be inclined to favor, one important objection against this kind of approach is that it does not fit with the argument from co-variance, which implies no asymmetry and, therefore, no priority between P and R. Facing this difficulty, some supporters of inseparatism have suggested what is sometimes called the 'no-priority-view' (Pautz 2008). The proposed alternative is to appeal to the notion of identity, to the effect that P and R would be identical. Let us call this the identity theory.
Strong intentionalists (Tye 2003 : 166ff, Crane 2001 16 hold that P is identical to R, and advocates of the 'phenomenal intentionality identity theory' (e.g., Mendelovici 2010) hold that R is identical to P. Since identity is a symmetrical relation, this amounts, in any case, to thinking of the P-R connection in roughly the same way (if divergences are to be found between Strong intentionalists and supporters of the phenomenal intentionality identity theory, they come from additional claims.) Thus, admittedly, adopting the identity theory seems to be the best way of accounting for the argument from introspection and the argument from co-variance. To use an often-mentioned metaphor, P and R would be, on this approach, like the two faces of the same coin.
This last theory probably deserves a lot of commentary. I shall restrict myself to two short remarks. First, one issue with the identity view, at first sight, is how to accommodate the publicity of representational content: If P is something private or subjective, and if R is something public or inter-subjective, viz. can be common to mental states experienced by different persons, then P and R cannot be identical. I do not wish to discuss this kind of worry here. Suffice it to say that the identity theory seems to me to be underdetermined by the argument from co-variance: After all, co-variance does not necessarily imply identity.
Pending a satisfactory account of the phenomena of unity and co-variance, we should do well not to exclude too fast other ways of describing the connection between intentionality and phenomenality. Second, in addition, supervenience and identity theories are hardly compatible with the historical claim according to which phenomenal intentionality is the kind of intentionality that Brentano and proto-Phenomenologists were dealing with (Graham et al. 16 Tye no longer supports strong representationalism in his 2009.
2007: 468, Kriegel 2013).
17 On Brentano's view, the unity of the mind does not imply in any sense the identity of intentionality and self-consciousness, nor does it imply the identity of representational content and qualitative character. Generally speaking, the mind's unity does not imply the mind's simplicity.
Unity not Simplicity
Central to Brentano's internalist description program is the idea that every mental occurrence is something that proves to be more or less complicated. According to the key distinction between act (or mode) and content, the complex (Verwickelung) that characterizes every mental occurrence may take two forms: It may be a multiplicity of acts or a multiplicity of contents. In the first case, we may experience at the same time various acts with the same content. This occurs, according to Brentano, when we represent p and judge that p, or when we represent p and desire that p, etc. Yet it is also the case that we experience one and the same act with various contents. For instance, when we make a syllogism, the very same act of thinking is directed at the same time both at the premises and at the conclusion; when we perceive a multi-colored picture, the very same act of representing (in this case an act of sensing) is directed at various colors. Such examples speak for the claim that the mental is something intrinsically complex. Furthermore, even if we put aside the cases just mentioned (the different-acts/same-content case and the same-act/different-contents case), there is an additional complexity that arises from the fact that every mental occurrence is self-perceiving.
Inner perception, on Brentano's view, shows a very peculiar structure. On the one hand, it 17 As far as I know, the first formulation of this historical claim is to be found in Chalmers (2004: 153) : "In the work of philosophers from Descartes and Locke to Brentano and Husserl, consciousness and intentionality were typically analyzed in a single package." This formulation, however, is somewhat misleading, for it neglects the fact that intentionality, within the phenomenological tradition, has developed partly against Descartes' and Locke's pictures of the mind. Husserl's methodological internalism has nothing to do with the (mistaken) claim that the mind always refers to its own 'ideas ' or 'presentations'. implies that one and the same act is directed at two 'objects', e.g., the act of hearing is directed at the <sound> and simultaneously at itself (see above: §1). On the other hand, inner perception is a kind of perception and as such it involves a multiplicity of acts or modes: The <hearing of the sound>, when self-perceived, is not only presented but also known as existing and felt as pleasant or unpleasant. 18 Thus, at any time t, our consciousness involves a multiplicity of elements in the widest sense of the word. As Brentano explicitly adds (1874/2008: 228/180 [1995: 161] ), the variety of the parts therefore excludes any identity between them:
It is clear that such real identity never holds between our concurrent mental activities, and that it will never be found between the diverse aspects of the simplest mental acts which were differentiated earlier. The perception of hearing is not identical with the feelings we have toward hearing.
Granted that every mental occurrence involves a multiplicity of elements, what kind of multiplicity is that? In Chapter IV of the second book of his 1874/2008, Brentano discusses the following alternative: Either it is a mere collection or 'bundle' of elements (a 'collective'), or it is a real unity, viz. a single thing which simply is divisible into various parts.
Roughly speaking, the first option goes back to Hume's famous bundle theory (Hume 1739) . By definition, a collective is a sum of several items that are likely to exist separately and that have, so to say, a merely nominal unity. It often occurs, indeed, that we refer to a collective by means of a single name. We use the name 'herd' to refer to a sum of individuals, the name 'city' to refer to a sum of houses, the name 'house' to refer to a sum of rooms, etc.
( Brentano 1874 Brentano /2008 Brentano : 222/176 [1995 ). All these words simply denote collectives, viz.
merely nominal unities made up of distinct things (individuals, houses, rooms, etc.). It is plain that the fact that we use a single word to refer to these sums does not imply that they are 'real' unities. To be sure, the herd and the city have some sort of unity-the sort of unity we could contrast, for instance, with the mere collection of various pieces of furniture in some furniture store-but this is not the unity of a single thing (res). Moreover, another characteristic of collectives is their ontological dependency: They are ontologically dependent upon their constituents (e.g., the herd has no reality besides that of the individuals that compose it). If the parts of a collective no longer exist, the collective itself no longer exists (e.g., demolishing the houses amounts to demolishing the city). To the contrary, each item that is part of a collective may exist separately or individually. Thus, holding that the elements of the mind form a collective amounts to taking the mind as a mere sum of items whose unity is merely nominal.
This is the view supported by some of Brentano's contemporaries, like Ernst Mach (1886).
Against such a view, Brentano holds that the elements of the mind form a real unity, viz. one single 'thing'. Still, "this does not mean that no multiplicity can be distinguished in it," for "unity and simplicity […] are concepts which are not interchangeable. Even if one real thing cannot be a multiplicity of real things, it can nevertheless contain a multiplicity of parts" (Brentano 1874 (Brentano /2008 (Brentano : 223/176 [1995 ). So, the mind's unity, on Brentano's view, is made up of parts that are not distinct things and, consequently, that cannot exist separately like in the case of a collective. In order to make a clear distinction between those inseparable parts and the parts of a collective, Brentano introduces the notion of 'divisive' (idem). The term is designed to refer to 'partial phenomena' (Teilphänomene), i.e., phenomena that exist as parts of broader phenomena. For instance, when I desire that p, the experience I undergo is that of a complex mental state that involves the act of representing p as a divisive, for it is not possible for me to desire that p without p being simultaneously represented. 
A Mereological Framework for Inseparatism
As this last example suggests, parts of the mental can be connected more or less intimately.
19 In his 1890-1/1982, Brentano explores this variety of connection modes and offers a typology of the parts of the mental. He distinguishes between (i) elements that are mutually separable or separable by two-sided separation (e.g., seeing and hearing), (ii) elements that are unilaterally separable or separable by one-sided separation (e.g., seeing and noticing, representing and desiring), and (iii) elements that are inseparable. Now, even in the cases where no actual separation is possible, he insists that conceptual separation may yet be possible; conceptually separated parts he calls 'distinctional parts', viz. parts obtained by distinction (e.g., the act of seeing and its content). 20 ( Fig. 1) The notion of 'distinctional part' is probably the key for Brentano's conception of the unity of the mind. It provides us at once with a definite framework to think of the intimate connection between intentionality and phenomenality that Inseparatists are seeking. Indeed, following Brentano, the notion of 'distinctional part' applies both to the so-called qualitative aspects of experience and to representational content. This approach may be represented using the following two theses:
(1) For any representational content R, R is nothing but a distinctional (proper) part of the relevant mental state M.
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(2) For any qualitative aspect Q, Q is nothing but a distinctional (proper) part of the relevant representational content R.
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In my view, these theses provide us with an interesting alternative to supervenience and identity theories. Unlike such theories, they accommodate the analytical dimension that attaches, according to Brentano, to any tentative description of the mental as it is personally experienced. Consider for instance the act of judging 'There is a truth.' In Brentano's terminology, the fact that this act is directed upon the object <truth>, hence its intentionality or directionality, is one of the judgement's distinctional parts, in addition to its affirmative quality, its self-evidence and its apodeictic modality (Brentano 1890 (Brentano -1/1982 (Brentano : 20 [2002 ). More importantly, the representational content itself is a distinctional part of the intentional act-content correlation, for it cannot be separated from the relevant act but only (e.g., affirmative quality and directionality of a judgement), 'logical' parts (e.g., presenting and feeling, feeling and visual feeling), parts of the intentional correlation, and parts of the inner perception (or, as he calls them, parts of the 'mental diplopia'). 21 Like Crane (2001), I contend that our mental states are individuated by intentional mode as well. Any intentional mode, on the proposed view, is another 'distinctional' part of the relevant mental state. 22 I add the qualification 'proper' in order to avoid the interpretation according to which the part could be identical to the whole (this would bring us back to the identity-version of phenomenal intentionality, see §3). Whatever the cultured smoker describes as qualitative aspects, these aspects are distinctional parts of the relevant representational content; they contribute to make it the content it is. The same applies to qualitative characters that the amateur of wines is able to distinguish, and so on. suppose I look at the duck-rabbit and perceive it as a rabbit: The experience I undergo may be described as that of perceiving a rabbit (or a picture of a rabbit), and this experience is obviously different from that of perceiving a duck (or a picture of a duck). Conversely, according to (2), changing one qualitative aspect of the representational content amounts to changing that very content, since the qualitative aspect is a distinctional part of the relevant content. As such, it contributes to the individuation of that content, making it the content it is.
Conclusion
The main goal in recent theories of phenomenal intentionality is to conceive the mind as something unified, something in which intentionality and phenomenality are closely related to one another. Recent suggestions that have been made in order to conceptualize this intimate 27 Compare with Brentano (1982 Brentano ( : 16-7 [1995 ): "If we have two spots before us which agree in lightness, in quality and maybe in other parts, and which differ only spatially [spatiality being taken here as an abstractive, distinctional part of the spots; AD], then they will appear as two, regardless of the manifold agreement. And, in fact, we do not only talk of two spatial determinations, but also of two individually different qualities [and] of two individually different lightnesses […] . An equal lightness precisely does not mean that it is individually and actually the same." Just like changing one abstractive part of a colored spot amounts to changing the spot itself, changing one abstractive part of a mental state (e.g., its content or its mode) amounts to changing the state itself, and hence this amounts to changing 'what it is like' to undergo that very state (see Horgan & Tienson 2002: 522) .
connection rest upon supervenience and identity claims. In this paper, I have suggested that there is little evidence supporting such claims, and that going back to Brentano may provide us with a more promising alternative.
Generally speaking, I think that the Brentanian distinction between description and explanation places us in a better stand to deal with the phenomenality-intentionality articulation or, more exactly, the PQR articulation (where P, Q, and R stand for Phenomenal, Qualitative, Representational) . Within contemporary philosophy of mind, tentative descriptions of mental occurrences are often combined with explanatory, reductionist, naturalistic or physicalist theses. In this respect, one important lesson that can be drawn from Brentano is that description of mental occurrences is not dependent upon metaphysical or epistemological assumptions. Note that the proposed view, in particular, is neutral on why a
given state has such and such content. No matter whether we hold that representational content is 'wide', i.e., determined by physical properties of objects in the world (as Tye and experienced qualitative character Q is best described as a part of the relevant content. So the claim that phenomenal character is not disconnected from intentionality may be said to be 'descriptively true' independently from the way we explain the rise of our mental states.
Conversely, provided we are in search for the best description of our mental states as they are first-personally experienced, it is 'descriptively true' that intentionality is not disconnected from phenomenality, no matter whether we conceive of intentional content as 'broad' or 'narrow'. Each time we speak of representational content or qualitative character, we pick out some abstractive part of a single unity, which is the relevant mental state. Representational content and qualitative character are nothing but the result of an analyzing process that let the unity of the mental unaltered.
